THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN OVERCOMING THE EROSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIBERAL ORDER IN THOMAS WEISS'S PERSPECTIVE

Helena Inácio

Membro associado do Observatório Político

About the author

Thomas G. Weiss was born in 1946, in the United States. He is Presidential Professor of Political Science at The City University of New York's Graduate Center and was director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, from 1998 to 2014. Weiss is co-director of the United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP) and chair of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS). He was editor of *Global Governance*, research director of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, research professor at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies, executive director of ACUNS and of the International Peace Academy, a member of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development secretariat, and a consultant to several public and private agencies (United Nations Intellectual History Project, 2019). Weiss has also held leadership positions and professional posts in several academic research institutes and in prominent nongovernmental organizations and think-tanks (CUNY Academic Commons, 2019b). He is a distinguished scholar of international relations and global governance with special expertise in the politics of the United Nations (UN). The author adheres to the constructivist school, has introduced the idea of a "Third UN" and directed the research team that popularized the concept of Responsibility to Protect - R2P (CUNY Academic Commons, 2019a).

Introduction

There is growing evidence that the foundations of the International Liberal Order (ILO) created even before the aftermath of the Second World War have been challenged. Several international actors, especially state-actors, have been derogating multilateralism and global concerted action, giving preference, instead, to protectionist and nationalist approaches. Moreover, the ideals of democracy and free trade have also been questioned, not only by its more traditional opponents, but also by its traditional advocator, the United States of America. This gives way to other states, such as China and Russia, among

others, that are not the "biggest fans" of the post-war order, an opportunity to affirm even more their illiberal ideals. Besides, with power shifting from the United States to China, world order may as well change.

The UN, one of the international organizations created specifically for the post-war period and which best represents the subsequent ILO, may have a special role in the midst of this apparent inversion of order in the world. The UN has the potential to act somewhat as a counter-balancing mechanism, in order to preserve those values and ideals so cherished in 1945, as well as to overcome constraints that transcend sovereignty and geographical borders.

Today, we live in a globalized world, where problems cannot be tackled only at the national level, and where there are more than only state-actors in the international arena. Indeed, there are thousands of new international actors. Therefore, international organizations, and, especially, the UN, need to develop new global governance approaches and improve those already existent.

Bearing in mind the described above, I revisit part of Thomas Weiss's academic work, in order to try to answer the question "Will the United Nations be able to overcome the current erosion of the International Liberal Order?". I will give particular relevance to the author's theorizing and development on the concept of "global governance" and the capacity of the UN as a keystone in the maintenance of the world order.

International Illiberal Order?

According to Moreira de Sá and Soller (2017), international order (or world order) can be defined as a set of norms, values and international institutions that regulate the "rules of the game" and allow cooperation at the most diverse levels, as well as punish the transgressor states. The current world order, commonly known as International Liberal Order, started to be built by the United States during the Second World War (1939-1945) and has expanded even more since after the end of the Cold War (in the 1990s). Therefore, the ILO has more than 70 years of existence. It is characterized by the dissemination of the ideals of democracy and free trade and, in some instances, it has overlapped with the westephalian ideals of sovereignty, especially in cases related with human rights.

However, Moreira de Sá and Soller argue that states that traditionally favor illiberal ideals, such as Russia and China (more visibly), as well as India and Brazil (less visibly), have recently started to contest the existing order. What surprised everyone was the fact that the United States themselves have started to contest the order as well, especially the moment Donald Trump reached the White House. According to Richard Haass (2018), the "America First" doctrine and the ILO seem to be incompatible.

According to Weiss (2019), the 45th United States president is constantly disparaging international organizations such as the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The current United States administration is against all forms of multilateralism and collective-action problem solving. Moreover, Trump is committed to substitute multilateral arrangements with a series of bilateral ones.

Some of the most obvious threats to the ILO already carried out by Trump's administration are, according to Weiss (2019): cutting funding to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA); withdrawing formally from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); pulling out of the Paris Agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; pulling out of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration; shredding the Iran deal brokered by the G5; withdrawing from the UN Human Rights Council; and halting all funds for Palestinian refugees.

The author states that Trump abides by the principles of nationalism and protectionism, holding on to the old sovereignty and independence prerogatives of states. Trump's ideals strongly clash with those of the ILO, namely, cosmopolitanism, free barriers and multilateral negotiations. This was made clear in his speech to the UN General Assembly, in September 2018, when he stated "We reject the ideology of globalism and we embrace the doctrine of patriotism" (White House, 2018). Moreover, he is paving the way for other countries who traditionally do not respect these values to disrespecting them even more, because now they do not have to deal with Washington's criticism for not respecting, for instance, human rights.

It should be noted, though, that the US president is not alone when it comes to pro-nationalism speeches. Indeed, as Weiss (2019) observes, nativist-populist "ages" are emerging everywhere (see Bolsonaro, Duterte, Erdogan, Maduro, Modi, Netanyahu, Obrador, Orbán, Putin, al-Sisi, Xi and rising right-wing parties across Europe), and they endanger global cooperation and international organizations. However, Trump "undoubtedly is the worst ailment of the United Nations" (Weiss, 2019, p. 15).

More "pessimistic" thinkers, like Moreira de Sá and Soller (2017), believe that, for the reasons mentioned above, a new "International Illiberal Order" has already started to be built. However, Weiss (2019) puts that hypotheses away by formulating a comparison between Trump and France's de Gaulle. Just as the 45th US president, de Gaulle also urged to denigrate multilateral institutions, but, in the end, most of them were ready to expand operations and membership. Thus, the author concludes that there is space for international cooperation to survive after Trump's departure from the White House.

Weiss also remembers us that, even though Trump's policy is without precedent, the relationship of the United States with multilateral cooperation has always been quite ambivalent. In fact, during the Second World War negotiations, wartime planners wanted everything except for unilateral military might and lawlessness. Instead, they believed that the post-war order should be underpinned by multilateralism and the rule of law, which is precisely what Trump is not keen on.

Global Governance

Weiss and Thakur 2010 (in Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014b, p. 208) define global governance as the "collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems and processes that [go] beyond the capacities of individual states (…) a capacity of the international system at any moment in time to provide government-like services in the absence of world government (…) a wide variety of cooperative problem-solving arrangements that [are] visible but informal (for example, practices or guidelines) or [are] temporary formations (for example, coalitions of the willing) (…) [it] could also be more formal, taking the shape of hard rules (laws and treaties) or else institutions with administrative structures and established practices to manage collective affairs by a variety of actors—including state authorities, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, private sector entities, and other civil society actors".

It is important not to confuse governance with government (Weiss, 2011): at the national level, we have "governance plus government", which is usually able to exert effective authority and control; however, at the international level we have "governance minus government", which means almost no capacity to ensure compliance with collective decisions.

According to Weiss (2009a), the term has emerged in the 1990s. In 1992, James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel published their theoretical collection of essays, entitled *Governance without Government*. Then, in 1995, the Commission on Global Governance published its policy-oriented report, entitled *Our Global Neighbourhood*. In that same year, the journal *Global Governance* published its first issue.

The term "global governance" emerged in the middle of a specific set of events that happened in the second half of the 20th century (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014b):

1. Beginning in the 1970s, people began to realize that problems that defied the problem-solving capacities of a single state had started to grow - "problems without passports" in the words of Kofi Annan 2002 (in Weiss and Thakur, 2010, p. 50) - indeed, interdependence

and rapid technological advances made collective-action measures more necessary than ever.

2. Starting in the 1980s, non-state actors (NSAs), particularly civil society and transnational for-profit corporations, started to grow in numbers and importance; NSAs started going "hand-in-hand" with state-actors and international organizations in the international arena.

3. Finally, after recognition of the first and second points, people began to concern over how to upgrade the UN system for the post-Cold War period; experts and decision-makers tried to strengthen the world body, advocating reform and partnerships with NSAs, in order to better tackle global problems.

Weiss and Wilkinson (2014b) tell us that the study of global governance has been substituting the study of intergovernmental organizations and law, as well as the study of world order. The latter had already substituted the studies of world peace and world law, however, it failed to capture the variety of actors, networks and relationships that characterize contemporary international relations. It is important to note, however, that no scholar has yet developed a specific theory about global governance.

The emergence of global governance as a term is also broadly associated with the advent of globalization. Weiss and Thakur (2010, p. 34) propose a simple definition for globalization: "a process of increased interconnectivity throughout the world". That process shapes the nature of collective action at various levels. According to Philip Cerny 1995 (in Weiss, 2000), the intensification of market activity and the complexification of economic organization are undermining the effectiveness of state-based collective action. Indeed, the author believes the end result will be a legitimation crisis of the state. Moreover, Weiss and Thakur (2010, p. 35) state that "globalization creates losers as well as winners and entails risks as well as provides opportunities", whereby they acknowledge the disadvantages of globalization in its current form. However, they consider that these problems do not lie solely in the globalization process, rather, they exist because the underlying global governance is weak.

Weiss and Wilkinson (2014b) remind us to be careful not to make the mistake of associating global governance with a particular moment in time (that is, the era of globalization or the post-Cold War era), because it would bring a risk of losing sight of the important questions of how the world is organized and authority exercised, not only at a given time, but throughout time. Just as the authors put it, "the future-oriented value lies in treating global governance as a set of questions that enable us to work out how the world is, was, and could be governed" (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014b, p. 213).

It is worth noting, not only what is global governance, but also what is considered good governance. Weiss (2010) claims that good governance focuses on attenuating the unrepresentative character of governments, therefore supporting political democratization, and on attenuating the inefficiency of non-market systems, therefore supporting economic liberalization. The author also states that it is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that leads in defining what good governance really is.

Weiss and Thakur (2010) believe that the main constraint in contemporary global problem solving is the fact that there is no central authority possessing full capability to both make global policy choices and mobilize the required resources to guarantee the compliance with those policies. Some authors believe that a world state is inevitable. Alexander Wendt fits in that group, for instance. But a genuine world state would imply, at least, some of the structures that we generally link to national governments, and that, recognize Weiss and Thakur, is very far from happening in today's world. Weiss (2019) notes that global governance is not the continuation of traditional power politics, but it is also not the expression of an evolutionary process leading to the formation of institutional structures capable of addressing current or future global menaces. As the constructivist that Weiss is, he would certainly say that global governance is what we make of it.

The United Nations special role

Weiss (2019) tells us that the UN - which was created during the Second World War - is one of the most important international organizations and is as old as the ILO, which is based in the principles established in the UN Charter. Over time, it has become a mechanism for governments to find areas of agreement and solve problems together. UN action is based on three fundamental pillars: peace and security; human rights and humanitarian action; and sustainable development; moreover, the UN Secretary-General is the world's most visible advocate and manager.

The UN organizational apparatus is customarily divided in two big blocs (Weiss and Thakur, 2010): the First UN, which is constituted by the member-states operating as state-actors within the international organization, is an essential forum for the expression and eventual coagulation of official state views on international norms; and the Second UN, composed of career and long-serving staff members who are paid through assessed and voluntary contributions, is an ongoing bureaucratic experiment in opening the range of inputs to include views other than western ones.

However, Weiss, Carayannis and Jolly (2009) go further, adding a Third UN to the game. According to the authors, the Third UN consists of "NGOs,

academics, consultants, experts, independent commissions, and other groups of individuals that routinely engage with the First and the Second UN and thereby influence UN thinking, policies, priorities, and actions" (Weiss, Carayannis and Jolly, 2009, p. 127). This third sphere is independent from governments and UN staff members, which makes it detached and unique.

According to the same authors, the three spheres mentioned above act as a whole, complementing each other. Not only do they provide a forum for debate, they also generate, legitimate, advocate, implement/test, manage resources and monitor the progress of pursuing ideas and policies.

Weiss (2019) states that the UN has had a significant impact in the world through the prosecution of its goals, briefly referred above in the three pillars which guide the organization's action. The author draws our attention to the fact that the UN was able to eradicate smallpox, polio and guinea worm, that it had a fundamental role in advocating women's rights across the world and in carrying out research on climate change, that it has put endless efforts into delivering emergency aid to war victims in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan, that it has carried out several peacekeeping missions around the globe, that it has taken steps in order to protect cultural heritage in war zones, to prosecute war criminals and to ban landmines.

But there are two main UN contributions worth describing in more depth. They concern the process of decolonization and the expansion of the human rights regime. According to Weiss (2018), the UN played an essential role in the achievement of national independence of former colonies, such that, in the first quarter century following the UN's foundation, the European imperial order had collapsed. Today, instead of the initial 51, there are 193 countries represented at the UN. In the author's words, "Decolonization was a necessary and essential contribution to contemporary world order" (Weiss, 2018, chap. 4, par. 8). Because of that, the world body has become fairer and more representative throughout time. Moreover, and in spite of having been built on the basis of inflexible national sovereignty, the world organization has been able to question more and more the westphalian principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, in order to expand the protection of human rights in the greatest possible number of territories. The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are the two pinnacles of the new human rights regime. According to Normand and Zaidi 2008 (in Weiss, 2018, chap. 4, par. 12) "compared to human rights, no other system of universal values had spread so far so fast". Weiss tells us that, especially through the R2P principle, adopted since the UN World Summit in 2005, the discussion about the quality of a country's political and economic governance system has become acceptable within international public policy forums. This is why, when asked whether the world would be a better place without the UN, Weiss's answer is a clear "no" (Weiss, 2019).

That is not to say, however, that the author does not see flaws in the international organization. In fact, Weiss (2018) acknowledges that UN performance could have been better sometimes, that there is space for improvement and that reforms are needed. Indeed, even though the system has been changing for the better since 1945, the author thinks it is still "imperfect and chaotic" (Weiss, 2018, chap. 4, par. 8).

Despite its shortcomings, however, and for all the reasons mentioned above, the UN is "the most universal and legitimate organization with the greatest potential for expansion" (Weiss, 2009a, p. 2). That is why, to the author, this international organization has a special role concerning global governance. It is an exceptional forum to seek consensus about normative approaches to address global challenges, allowing states to codify international norms in the form of soft and hard law, and it is the centre of a new global system of public and private organizations (Murphy, 2014), meaning it has a unique capability of gathering and coordinating the work of NGOs all over the globe. Therefore, Weiss believes that the UN can and should be the locus of multilateral diplomacy and collective action to solve global problems.

Moreover, the author believes that we do not need to strengthen UN intergovernmental capabilities, instead, we should strive to make a "quantum shift" in the way we think about international organizations. He appeals to scholars, particularly, to be creative and think of the ways the world order *should be*, particularly an order that goes beyond the anarchy of inter-state relations, and not just be limited to analysing how it *is.*

According to Weiss (2009b, p. 78), current intergovernmental organizations, like the UN, are "insufficient in scope and ambition, inadequate in resources and reach, and incoherent in policies and philosophies". However, global problems need an adequate global response, which should be provided, first and foremost, by a refreshed problem-solving UN system. The UN has become an embedded part of today's world order, and, in the current power shifting scenario, it is essential in preserving and improving the rules-based order that we have and which is in everyone's interest (Weiss, 2019). In sum, "In light of its universality and scope, the United Nations will have a special role, albeit not a monopoly, on future leadership for global governance" (Weiss, 2000, p. 184).

The importance of ideas

As an adherent to the constructivist theory, Weiss attributes great importance to ideas. Weiss, Carayannis and Jolly (2019) state that research and oral histories from the UNIHP demonstrate that ideas have made a substantial contribution to international society. Indeed, the author believes that ideas are one of the UN's most important legacies.

According to Weiss and Wilkinson (2014b), ideas are important because they are the value systems upon which international organizations sit, the discourses in which they are embedded, and the interests to which they speak. In other words, international organizations are the institutionalized form of ideas. The authors claim that the individuals, networks and institutions that generate, disseminate and mediate those ideas, respectively, are also very important, as are the processes through which they are translated into forms of organization and policy delivery.

According to Hall (2014), the constructivist school argues that the international order is shaped by ideas that arise out of social interaction. Those ideas can become institutionalized as norms and rules, and help determine the identities of international actors, particularly states, as well as their interests. Constructivism argues that the way states act in the international arena is based on their perception of what the international order is, i.e., their behaviour is based on ideas. The international order, and, consequently, states, international organizations and NSAs, are socially constructed from the bottom to the top. Even power is a social construction.

Weiss and Wilkinson (2014a) tell us that Constructivism focuses also on the processes of change in the international order and it is one of the few International Relations theories that approaches global governance. As a result, it is able to develop models of possible future world orders, entertaining questions not only of how the world *is* governed, but also of how it *ought to be* governed.

The constructivist school gives relevance, as well, to the definition of international regime. Has Ruggie 1982 (in Weiss and Thakur, 2010, p. 46) argues, international regimes are "social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations". They consist of accepted principles, norms and policies and create an intersubjective framework of meaning. Hall (2014) states that international regimes provide legitimation and help create stable expectations, as they prescribe some behaviours and proscribe others. A good example would be the human rights regime described above. As Barnett and Finnemore 2004 (in Hall, 2014, p. 150) argue, the UN determines "not only who is in violation of human rights, but what human rights are".

Moreover, Goldstein and Keohane 1993 (in Weiss and Thakur, 2010) argue that policy can be shaped by ideas in several ways: ideas point actors in the right direction, influence actors' strategy choices and may become embedded in institutions. However, as affirms Weiss (2009a), even though institutions, such as the ones of the UN, embody ideas, they can also provide a platform for challenging new and already embodied ones. As an illustration, we may observe how the principle of state sovereignty has been challenged throughout the years and the way in which the UN, organization in which it was

unquestioned at first, has been slowly giving more and more relevance to the R2P principle.

Finally, Weiss and Wilkinson (2014b) draw our attention to the fact that we still do not fully understand how ideas that drive UN action arise and develop, and then permeate and modify the international system. A challenge left to ambitious scholars.

Other perspectives

Weiss's theoretical construction is not free of criticism. The author's two strongest adversaries are the mainstream International Relations theories of Realism and Liberalism. Starting with the first, Realism is the most well-known theory in this study area, as well as probably the biggest opponent to Weiss's theory. According to Weiss and Wilkinson (2014a), the realist school argues that states remain the primary actors in international affairs, recognising little relevance in international organizations and NSAs. It is quite a "pessimistic" school, according to the authors, for it characterizes the international system as anarchical, meaning that there is no central authority above the state to ensure order and stability in the world. States are supposedly guided by their relative power capability and they are forced to constantly engage in self-help behaviour, in order to ensure their own survival. States are also rational actors, that is, they do a cost-benefit calculation before they act.

The realist school, argue Charrette and Sterling-Folker (2014), considers global governance to be a phenomenon contingent on power politics, i.e., believes that there are deeper structures of power that shape global collective-action. According to the authors, contemporary world order is sustained through a particular distribution of power, particularly, United States hegemonic power, and, now that the power distribution is changing, so will change the world patterns of organization and management. Thus, they are sceptical about the preservation of the current ILO.

Weiss (2009b), however, has developed a wise counter-argument against realists' idea that the absence of a central authority is an unalterable fact. The author reminds them that E. H. Carr, one of the founding fathers of Realism, has advised readers, in the interwar years, that "blending utopia and power in thinking [is] necessary in order to avoid stagnation and despair" (Weiss, 2009b, p. 77). That is to say, of course, that we need to develop a vision of where we should be headed, because descriptions of where we are right now are not sufficient.

Another opponent of Weiss's theory is Liberalism. This mainstream theory is less critical of the author's work, since there are a few aspects they both have in common. However, according to Forsythe (2014), the liberal school shares

realists believe that states are the key players in the international arena, that they are rational actors and that the international system is anarchical. It differs from the latter, though, because it is a more "optimistic" school, according to the author. Liberals believe that states share moments of common interest and, therefore, the most rational option they can make is to cooperate with each other in order to achieve those interests. They also claim that the utility of military force declines under conditions of increased economic interdependence.

Forsythe (2014) states that where liberals come to a consensus with Weiss's vision is in the fact that, after all, they consider that cooperation may become institutionalized and regularized, therefore attributing great importance to international institutions, which they claim to have a beneficial impact. According to the author, an element included both in liberal and constructivist interpretations is the fact that they see international institutions as capable of getting states to change how they think about their identities and their interests, through the rules, norms and regimes they create.

Another critical approach worth noting comes from Acharya 2004 (in Hall, 2014). This author challenges moral cosmopolitanism, i.e., a universal spreading of values, proposing, instead, what he calls "norm localization" and "norm subsidiarity", in order to attribute more importance to the role played by local actors in the process of norm diffusion. For the author, "norm localization" consists of an active construction of emerging universal ideas by local actors, resulting in the development of significant congruence with local beliefs and practices. In turn, "norm subsidiarity" consists in the creation of rules by local actors, in order to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors.

Conclusion

The International Liberal Order that we know for more than 70 years and that is characterized by multilateral relations and the rule of law, as well as for the spread of democracy and free trade, is under threat. Several countries have been challenging it, especially China and Russia, but the main threat comes from its own designer, the United States. Trump's administration advocates everything but the founding principles of the ILO. Instead, it abides by nationalist and populist narratives. This way, some authors, such as Moreira de Sá and Soller, believe in the ongoing formation of an "International Illiberal Order".

Weiss, however, is sceptical about that hypotheses. The author has developed an extensive study about the concept of global governance, stating that it has emerged in the 1990s mainly because of three factors: "problems without

passports" started to grow, inducing the need for global collective-action; NSAs started growing in number and importance, sharing the international arena with states and international organizations; and the need arose to upgrade the UN system for the post-Cold War era. Global governance is also associated with globalization, since the latter is undermining the effectiveness of state-based collective action. Weiss believes that the main constraint in today's global problem-solving approaches is the fact that there is no central authority with full capacity to make global policy choices and to ensure their application. Thus, even though the author recognizes that a world government is very far from happening, he claims it is necessary to develop and strengthen better global governance approaches, with the aim of achieving that long-term goal.

The most well suited international organization to accomplish that assignment would, according to Weiss, certainly be the UN. Despite its shortcomings, concerted action of the First, Second and Third UNs provides an exceptional forum to seek consensus about normative approaches to address global challenges. Besides, these three institutions make the UN the centre of a new global system of public and private organizations. Moreover, the UN has had a significant beneficial impact in the world through the prosecution of its goals, especially through the process of decolonization and the expansion of the human rights regime. Therefore, in the current power shifting scenario, the UN is essential in preserving and improving the world order designed during the Second World War, and which, according to Weiss, is in everyone's interest.

As a Constructivism adherent, Weiss gives great relevance to ideas. Essentially, that school of thought considers the international order to be based on a set of social constructions. According to it, ideas are important because international organizations, such as the UN, are their institutionalized form. Moreover, constructivists spend time analysing the processes of change in international order, and claim that institutions provide a platform, not only to embody ideas, but also for challenging new and already embodied ones. Constructivists like Weiss, therefore, create space for analysing how the world *ought to be* and claim that we should strive to make a "quantum shift" in the way we think about international organizations, and, more specifically, their role in providing global governance.

In trying to answer the question "Will the United Nations be able to overcome the current erosion of the International Liberal Order?", I take the words of the author: "By not even struggling to imagine a fundamentally different system, we make the continuation of the current lackluster one inevitable" (Weiss, 2009b, p. 77). That is, the menaces that threat the ILO can only be tackled through the reformation and reinforcement of the UN system, particularly of its global governance approaches. We must be able to "think outside the box" and imagine a different world order that is not solely based on state-actors and where global concerted action is more feasible and efficient. Only that way will the UN be able to overcome the current erosion of the ILO.

Global institutions, especially those of the UN, are still as fragile as they were in the moment of their birth. However, the world is very different from that of 70 years ago and there are new and big global challengers. As Amartya Sen has once said, "The need for critical scrutiny of standard preconceptions and political-economic attitudes has never been stronger" (Amartya Sen, 1999, in Weiss, 2000, p. 184). Weiss's theoretical construction has its critics, especially those who sympathise with the realist and liberal school, but also others who come from different cultural and theoretical backgrounds, such as Acharya, and perhaps he is a little ahead of his time. However, as the author says, "It is never wise to hazard predictions; but there is nonetheless room for hope" (Weiss, 2019, p. 12).

Acknowledgments

References

Borger, J. (2019) "Trump urges world to reject globalism in UN speech that draws mocking laughter", *The Guardian* [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/25/trump-united-nations-general-assembly-speech-globalism-america (Accessed April 2019)

Charrette, J. and Sterling-Folker, J. (2014) "Realism" in Weiss, T. and Wilkinson, R. (eds.) *International Organization and Global Governance*. New York: Routledge, pp. 93-104.

CUNY Academic Commons (2019a) *Thomas Weiss* [online]. Available at: https://politicalscience.commons.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/thomas-g-weiss/ (Accessed April 2019)

CUNY Academic Commons (2019b) *Core Bios – Thomas G. Weiss* [online]. Available at: https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Faculty/Core-Bios/Thomas-G-Weiss (Accessed April 2019)

Forsythe, D. P. (2014) "Neoliberal Institutionalism" in Weiss, T. and Wilkinson, R. (eds.) *International Organization and Global Governance*. New York: Routledge, pp. 118-131.

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2019) *About R2P* [online]. Available at:

http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p (Accessed April 2019)

Haass, R. N. (2018) "Liberal World Order, RIP". *Council on Foreign Relations* [online]. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/article/liberal-world-order-rip (Accessed April 2019)

Hall, R. B. (2014) "Constructivism" in Weiss, T. and Wilkinson, R. (eds.) *International Organization and Global Governance*. New York: Routledge, pp. 144-156.

Moreira de Sá, T. and Soller, D. (2017) "A nova ordem internacional iliberal", *Público* [online]. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2017/01/29/mundo/opiniao/a-nova-ordem-internacional-iliberal-1760011 (Accessed April 2019)

Murphy, C. (2014) "The Emergence of Global Governance" in Weiss, T. and Wilkinson, R. (eds.) *International Organization and Global Governance*. New York: Routledge, pp. 23-34.

United Nations (2019a) *History of the United Nations* [online]. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html (Accessed April 2019)

United Nations (2019b) *Overview* [online]. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/index.html (Accessed April 2019)

United Nations Intellectual History Project (2019) *Thomas G. Weiss* [online]. Available at: http://www.unhistory.org/CD/Weiss.html (Accessed April 2019)

Weiss, T. (2000) "Governance, Good Governance, and Global Governance - Conceptual and actual challenges" in Weiss, T. (ed.) *Thinking about global governance - Why people and ideas matter.* New York: Routledge, pp. 168-189.

Weiss, T. (2009a) "The UN's Role in Global Governance", *United Nations Intellectual History Project*, Briefing Note 15 [online]. Available at: http://www.unhistory.org/briefing/15GlobalGov.pdf (Accessed April 2019)

Weiss, T. (2009b) "What happened to the idea of world government?" in Weiss, T. (ed.) *Thinking about global governance - Why people and ideas matter.* New York: Routledge, pp. 66-86.

Weiss, T., Carayannis, T. and Jolly, R. (2009) "The «Third» United Nations", *Global Governance*, 15 (1), pp. 123-142.

Weiss, T. and Thakur, R. (2010) *Global Governance and the UN: An unfinished journey*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Weiss, T. and Wilkinson, R. (2014a) "International Organization and Global Governance - What matters and why" in Weiss, T. and Wilkinson, R. (eds.) *International Organization and Global Governance*. New York: Routledge, pp. 3-19.

Weiss, T. and Wilkinson, R. (2014b) "Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority, Power, Change", *International Studies Quarterly*, 58 (1), pp. 207-215.

Weiss, T. (2018) *Would the world be better without the United Nations?.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Weiss, T. (2019) "The UN and Multilateralism under siege in the «Age of Trump»", *Global Summitry* [online]. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/globalsummitry/advance-article/doi/10.1093/global/guy013/5301678 (Accessed April 2019)

White House (2018) *Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly* [online]. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/ (Accessed April 2019)

OBSERVATÓRIO POLÍTICO

Rua Almerindo Lessa
Pólo Universitário do Alto da Ajuda,
1349-055 Lisboa
Tel. (00351) 21 361 94 30
geral@observatoriopolitico.pt

Para citar este trabalho/ To quote this paper: